I. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

ExecutiveSummary

          Since 1999, Falungong practitioners have been the target of an aggressive and often violent crackdown by the Chinese government, one aspect of much broader tightening of controls on individuals and organizations whose activities China’s leaders perceive as threatening to Chinese Communist Party control. The past two years have witnessed a deterioration in civil liberties nationwide, with disparate groups—political dissidents, foreign scholars, labor organizers, religious believers worshiping outside official aegis, activists in Tibet and Xinjiang, Internet users, academics, and editors whose messages challenge the Party line, among others—facing new restrictions and abuses. The crackdown on Falungong is both symptomatic of the larger trend and significant in its own right for the vehemence with which the authorities have moved to eradicate the organization and “reeducate” its members.

          Falungong is a modern variant of ancient Chinese practices of exercise, deep breathing, and meditation, collectively known as qigong, that enthusiasts claim promotes physical, mental, and spiritual well-being by enhancing the flow of vital energy through a person’s body. There is no question that Falungong promotes salvationist and apocalyptic teachings in addition to its qigong elements. Despite its own protestations to the contrary, it also has a well-organized and technologically sophisticated following and has deliberately chosen a policy of confrontation with authorities. But the confrontations have been peaceful. Apart from those held in connection with the self-immolation suicides in Beijing in January 2001, none of the tens of thousands of Falungong practitioners detained, arrested, or convicted have been held in connection with violent actions or threats of violence. Instead, their “crime” is their belief in Falungong and their efforts to promote the practice. As such, their treatment violates fundamental rights – freedom of conscience and belief, freedom to associate with others who share one’s beliefs, and freedom to exchange information within and across borders.

          This report provides a comprehensive account of the emergence of Falungong in China and the government’s response, with particular emphasis on events since the mass Falungong demonstration on April 25, 1999 outside Zhongnanhai, the compound in Beijing housing China’s leaders. The report sets forth a detailed chronology of major developments as well as analysis of existing data, much of it flawed, on who is in custody in prisons, reeducation through labor camps, psychiatric institutions, and other incarceration facilities and how they have been treated. Additional chapters address how the crackdown by Chinese authorities on Falungong practitioners has spread beyond the mainland to Hong Kong and other countries, and analyze some of the key reasons for the Chinese government’s vehement response to Falungong. Two aspects of the Chinese response are highlighted: the decision to ban Falungong and make its eradication a national priority, and the decision to craft a series of laws and legal decisions, explanations, and interpretations to justify and implement the crackdown, a development that has much to say about Chinese authorities’ manipulation of the legal system.

          A separate chapter is devoted to the case of Zhang Kunlun, now living in Canada, but detained in China four times between June 30, 2000 and January 10, 2001. On one occasion he was beaten and tortured until he said he “lost his mind”; throughout his time in custody, he was subjected to threats and other forms of psychological coercion aimed at inducing him to abandon his Falungong beliefs. The case concretely illustrates many aspects of the Chinese government’s response to Falungong, including the considerable attention local authorities have paid to those they evidently consider “leading members” of the movement who might be induced to repent and provide evidence against more serious “backbone elements.” The case also illustrates the mounting frustration of the Chinese leadership in the face of Falungong members’ tenacity, and the government’s reliance on the administrative, extrajudicial reeducation through labor system despite its repeated insistence that its response demonstrates a commitment to the rule of law.

          The emergence of Falungong in May 1992 was part of a nationwide resurgence of membership in qigong groups that began during the 1980s as many of the tight controls that marked the Cultural Revolution (1966-76) were lifted. In 1989, the official China Qigong Scientific Research Association announced that “one in twenty Chinese...now practices qigong.” Falungong, founded by Li Hongzhi, was probably the most successful of the affiliates in the early 1990s. Although details are sketchy, there is evidence of tensions between Falungong leaders and authorities as early as 1994, and, by 1998, Li had settled in the United States. The April 25, 1999 10,000 person Falungong rally changed a de facto government policy of tolerance to a campaign of suppression. By July 1999, Chinese authorities had banned Falungong; by October they had declared it an “evil cult.” The stream of detentions and arrests that began immediately after the mass rally was continuing as of this writing.

          In one sense, there is nothing new about the Chinese Communist Party’s response to Falungong. For hundreds, if not thousands, of years, quasi-religious mass organizations have emerged at irregular intervals to challenge China’s rulers. For hundreds of years, China’s rulers have viewed as politically most threatening those that combine elements of charismatic leadership, a high degree of organization, and mass appeal. They have labeled such organizations “heretical cults” or “sects” and moved forcefully to eradicate them. The 1900 Boxer Rebellion is only one of many well-documented examples. The decision to label Falungong a “cult” is thus a political one, with potentially far-reaching political consequences. Many of the methods used during the crackdown also echo earlier efforts by the Chinese Communist Party, beginning shortly after it took power, to eradicate religion and, when that proved impossible, to organize and control it.

          Official Chinese sources have cited many factors in support of their decision to label Falungong (or Falun Dafa as practitioners prefer) a cult, among them the organization’s hierarchical structure and the notion that U.S.-based Falungong leader Li Hongzhi—“Master Li” to his followers—will be the savior of mankind. Chinese officials claim that Li's followers are willing to follow his instructions blindly “even to death.” The reference originally was to Li's suggestion that the health benefits of “cultivation,” as practitioners call their exercise-meditation and spiritual regime, would obviate the need for medical treatment. But the January 23, 2001 self-immolation attempts by seven alleged Falungong members in Tiananmen Square, Beijing’s most important public space, gave the government new ammunition for its arguments.

          China’s leaders pointed also to Falungong’s alleged disruption of public order, stability, and social ethics; to its anti-scientific beliefs that Chinese authorities claimed would hinder China’s march to economic development and increasing global influence; and to its flouting of Chinese law. They stressed Falungong’s political aspects and purported collusion with “anti-China forces abroad” and enemies within, including advocates of Taiwan and Tibet independence. At the same time, as already noted, the Chinese leadership claimed to have followed strictly legal methods in dealing with the Falungong threat. The record, however, shows something very different.

          Although the analysis provided here is necessarily provisional and far from complete, serious human rights violations—including restrictions on freedom of thought, belief, and expression, wrongful detention, unfair trials, torture, and deaths in custody—have accompanied the Chinese government response to Falungong. China does not allow independent monitors in prisons and reeducation camps and has made it too dangerous for family members, friends, or workmates to speak with journalists or other outsiders except under strictly controlled conditions. Despite this fundamental limitation, there is substantial evidence that, since Falungong was officially banned in July 1999, tens of thousands of practitioners have been temporarily detained and thousands have routinely been sentenced to administrative “reeducation through labor” terms as long as three years. A marked discrepancy exists between Falungong and Chinese explanations for deaths in custody and accounts of treatment of inmates in prisons, reeducation camps, and other facilities, but there is substantial evidence that torture and other abuses are common during “transformation” sessions in at least some of the facilities.

          Far fewer individuals—government figures as of August 2001 admit to some 350; Falungong sources as of April 2001 list 260—have been judicially prosecuted. Although Chinese government public relations materials have repeatedly alleged that Falungong leaders purposefully delude followers into committing irrational and dangerous acts, such as refusing medical treatment, there is little evidence that more than a handful of Falungong adherents have been tried on such charges. Until mid-2001, prison sentences, ranging from three to eighteen years, appear to have been reserved almost exclusively for key Falungong leaders; for those involved in large-scale printing, publication, and distribution of Falungong materials for use within China; and for those who publicize abuses to an overseas audience. By August 2001, however, after intense government pressure had shut down such activities, prison sentences, in the most severe cases up to thirteen years, were imposed on individuals charged with organizing the printing of leaflets and banners, using the Internet to circulate Falungong materials, or arranging meetings of practitioners. One alleged practitioner received a life sentence for his part in organizing the self-immolation incident in January 2001.

          The struggle by Chinese authorities against Falungong has not been limited to the Chinese mainland but has spilled over to Hong Kong and countries in Asia and the West. Falungong leaders have sought leverage and legitimacy by urging governments in the West and throughout Asia to express outrage at China’s human rights violations and to pressure the Chinese leadership to reverse its ban. With the crackdown underway and the possibility that Falungong’s visibility within China would wane, its leaders have also promoted the growth of the movement in countries outside China to demonstrate Falungong’s continued vitality and effectiveness.

          In spite of Falungong’s extraordinarily skillful advocacy campaign and the risks ethnic Chinese practitioners living outside China have been willing to take, neither effort has been entirely successful. China responded to Western condemnation with accusations of interference, collusion, and ignorance of the danger Falungong presented to China and to individual practitioners. In Asian cities—Hong Kong, Singapore, Bangkok, Tokyo—where a vibrant Falungong presence might have helped sustain the movement, China went on the diplomatic offensive.

          Foreign governments generally have been unwilling or unable to do much in the face of the Chinese crackdown on Falungong beyond providing rhetorical defense for practitioners’ basic rights. In some cases, foreign governments have responded to Chinese government pressure by turning their backs on reports of abuses, denouncing Falungong, or, in isolated instances, limiting Falungong members’ freedom of association and expression in their own countries. In Hong Kong, the government, caught between responding to pressure from Beijing and demonstrating its autonomy, has characterized Falungong as an “evil cult” that bears watching, but has refrained from enacting any laws that would shut it down. In other parts of Asia, treatment of Falungong appears to be emerging as an important test of governments’ commitment to civil liberties in view of the presence of small, unpopular, but vocal Falungong communities in many countries in the region and China’s policy of demanding that such communities be silenced as a precondition to good relations.

          As of this writing, it appears that the Chinese government has succeeded in thinning the numbers of Falungong practitioners within China. Those still committed to keeping the movement alive have, for the most part, gone underground.

Note on methodology:

          Almost all the information available to Human Rights Watch comesfrom either official Chinese government (such as Xinhua, the official news agency; People’s Daily; or Zhongguo Xinwen She, an official news service for overseas Chinese) or Falungong sources, both of which obviously have a stake in releasing data that supports their respective claims. In most cases, the accounts are inconsistent. However, the often conflicting versions together give a picture of the scope of the crackdown. In cases where competing accounts of the same events are available, we have noted the discrepancies in order to illustrate the claims each is presenting. Reliable firsthand reports of the treatment meted out to Falungong practitioners in China have been almost impossible to obtain. Human Rights Watch’s lengthy telephone interviews with Zhang Kunlun, described in detail in Chapter IV below, corroborates much of what we learned from our analysis of other materials.

Recommendations

To the Chinese government:

          Immediately release from detention and incarceration all Falungong followers held for peaceful practice of their beliefs.

          Permit the resumption of public and private Falungong practice.

          Remove all mention of “superstitious sects,” “secret societies, and “evil religious organizations” (Article 300) from the PRC Criminal Law; rescind subsequent interpretations, decisions, and explanations relevant to article 300, and bring other laws and regulations into conformity with the revisions. Human Rights Watch recognizes that individual members of a spiritual group may properly be punished for acts that directly endanger the health and safety of others. A general criminalization of belief, opinion, and expression, however, contradicts international human rights standards. Article 300, as demonstrated in its application to Falungong practitioners, fails to distinguish between belief and dangerous act.

          Abolish the inherently arbitrary reeducation through labor system to allow anyone who has been deprived of his liberty the right a court hearing and due process.

          Re-issue invitations to the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Torture and the Special Rapporteur on Religious Freedom to visit China on terms consistent with their mandates.

          Permit domestic and foreign observers to attend all trials including those of Falungong practitioners as provided for under international human rights standards.

          Implement the recommendations of the U.N. Committee against Torture, endorsed by the Special Rapporteur, including: revision of the definition of torture in domestic law so that it fully complies with the definition in the Convention Against Torture; investigation of all allegations of torture in an impartial and thorough fashion; and abolition of regulations requiring permission before a suspect in custody may see a lawyer.

          Amend the “Regulations on the Registration and Management of Social Organizations” and revise the “PRC Law on Assembly, Procession and Demonstration” to eliminate clauses that allow for politically motivated vetting of applicants.

          Revise the PRC Law on Protecting State Secrets so as to limit the scope of information deemed secret in line with international free expression standards.

          Revise regulations that effectively censor the media and the Internet and that interfere with the freedom to seek, receive, and impart information in accordance with international human rights standards.

To the Hong Kong government:

          Do not deny visas or otherwise deny entry on the basis of Falungong affiliation.

          Reject pressure from Beijing to restrict Falungong practitioners’ rights to freedom of association and assembly.

          Oppose the enactment of any anti-subversion law that is inconsistent with international human rights standards on the rights to free assembly, association, and expression. In no case should such legislation permit punishment of individuals for peaceful expression of their beliefs or views or for dissolution of the organizations to which they belong.

To the international community:

          Resist Chinese government pressure to deny asylum or refugee status to all Falungong practitioners; rather treat each case on its merits.

          Accord Falungong practitioners the right to free assembly as provided for under international human rights standards.

          Human Rights Watch urges the international community to continue to speak out against China’s deplorable human rights record, including its treatment of Falungong practitioners, particularly through support for a resolution at the 2002 March-April meeting of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights.

To corporations doing business in China:

          Refrain from assisting Chinese authorities in imposing censorship on websites or on other Internet-related material in China such as e-mail.

          Refrain from complying with demands by Chinese authorities to fire or discipline workers for Falungong practice or related activities protected by international law.

II. WHAT IS FALUNGONG?

          Falungong is a form of qigong, an ancient Chinese deep-breathing exercise system sometimes combined with meditation that enthusiasts claim promotes physical, mental, and spiritual well-being by enhancing the flow of vital energy through a person’s body. It also includes elements of popular Buddhism and Daoism and offers followers a road to salvation.¹ 

          Membership in qigong groups surged during the 1980s as many of the tight controls that marked the Cultural Revolution period (1966-76) were lifted. In 1989, the official China Qigong Scientific Research Association, established in 1985, announced that “one in twenty Chinese—both old and young, strong and weak—now practices qigong.”² Its popularity continued through the 1990s as the official association sponsored research into the scientific components of qigong, applauded its proven health benefits and traditional Chinese roots, and championed proselytization by its numerous affiliate groups.

          Falungong, founded by LiHongzhi in May 1992, was probably the most successful of the affiliates. The China Qigong Scientific Research Association approved the Falungong Research Branch Society for membership as a direct-affiliate branch the following year. Li, whose title became Direct-affiliate Qigong Master, continued to teach Falungong training seminars in Beijing and the northeastern provinces, his home base, under the auspices of local branches of the association until September 1994. The relationship between Li and the association soon deteriorated and the affiliation was eventually terminated, although the exact sequence of events and reasons for termination remain unclear. Li continued to teach Falungong for a time, both in China and overseas, finally settling in the U.S. in 1998.

          Falungong did not officially withdraw from the China Qigong Scientific Research Association until 1996. During 1994-96, it had tried to ensure its legality and independence and to establish its credentials as more than an exercise group through registration as a social organization. After it applied unsuccessfully in turn to the National Minorities Affairs Commission, the China Buddhist Association, and the United Front Department, the work units of the six individuals who signed the applications warned them that all registration efforts must stop. As a result, Falungong spokespersons said, Falungong decentralized its organizational structure, and local groups affiliated with branches of China’s sports administration.³

          In 1996, Falungong suffered a second setback in its efforts to gain legal recognition when the government’s Press and Publications Administration issued a “Notice Concerning the Immediate Confiscation and Sealing Up of Five Kinds of Books, including China’s Falun Gong.”⁴ In banning the five Falungong publications, the notice cited another Press and Publications Administration document, the “Notice Concerning the Banning of Books That Propagate Ignorance and Superstition.” The sanctions were extended in 1998-99.

          These setbacks did not impede Falungong’s growth. Neither did quiet objections from some officials, academics, and journalists who as early as 1996 questioned Falungong’s belief structure and quasi-religious character, its “anti-scientific nature,” alleged anti-modernization outlook, and willingness to defy Chinese authorities. Even alarm at the number of practitioners, some forty million at the end of 1998 by government count, did not stifle Falungong’s ability to organize.⁵ Part of the reason stemmed from officials’ fear that by openly challenging it, the government would be compelled to consider whether Falungong was a religion. Opening that debate would force the Chinese leadership to confront its policy of recognizing only Buddhism, Daoism, Catholicism, Islam, and Protestantism as legitimate faiths.⁶ The official indecision allowed Falungong to quietly confront open challenges and usually to extract apologies for derogatory remarks. In 1996, for example, when Enlightenment Daily, a newspaper with a major interest in cultural matters, critiqued Li Hongzhi’s work, a Falungong protest at the paper secured a retraction. In 1998, when He Zuoxiu, a renowned physics professor and implacable foe of all kinds of superstition, of which he considered Falungong one, criticized the group in an interview on Beijing Television, a protest at the station by some 2,000 practitioners succeeded in securing a retraction and a subsequent favorable report.

          It should be noted that Falungong is not the only qigongorganization that has come under attack since the late 1990s. The Chinese government began dismantling one of the largest, Zhonggong, in December 1999, later declaring it an “evil cult,” banning it, and seizing its assets.⁷ From the time its leader, Zhang Hongbao, surfaced in Guam and requested asylum in the United States, the Chinese government fought unsuccessfully for his return.⁸ The Chinese government has continued to arrest and sentence Zhonggong members since Zhang’s petition for asylum was granted in June 2001.⁹

          Practitioners say Falungong is a higher or advanced form of qigong.¹⁰ Its exercise regimen is said to deliver greater health benefits than other qigong systems and its belief system, emphasizing truthfulness (zhen), compassion (shan), and forbearance (ren), is said to encourage the highest standards of moral behavior and to augment the goodness already present within individuals and within society.¹¹ There is an added incentive for the individual practitioner. As the impulse to be good and do good grows, he or she is said to be able to attain supernatural powers with the help of a master, such as the ability to literally see what most others cannot.

          There is no question that salvationist and apocalyptic ideas are part of the Falungong canon. In Zhuan Falun, Li Hongzhi’s major text, the promise of salvation is explicitly offered “unconditionally” to humankind out of “compassion.” Through practice of a “righteous way,” Li says, there can be salvation for all. “We teach salvation of both ourselves and others, as well as of all beings. Thus, Falun can save oneself by turning inward and save others by turning outward.”¹² Li also says that human civilizations are cyclically destroyed, stating in Zhuan Falun: “I made a careful investigation once and found that humankind has undergone complete annihilation eighty‑one times. With a little remaining from the previous civilization, only a small number of people would survive and enter the next period, again living a primitive life.”¹³ He refers to the present as the “Last Havoc.”¹⁴

          Although it borrows from Buddhism and Daoism, Falungong maintains in its own publications that it is not a religion, and that none of its exercises can be characterized as religious rituals. In response to official accusations that the Falungong leadership had fashioned a tight organizational structure similar to that of the Chinese Communist Party so as to facilitate overthrow of the government, practitioners respond that there is no organization, no hierarchy, and that they harbor no “political intentions”; “no one,” they say “can tell anyone else what to do.”¹⁵ In 1999, however, the government cited the existence of a hierarchically organized geographic structure of thirty-nine main “stations,” 1,900 “guidance stations,” and 28,000 “exercise sites” as evidence to bolster its accusations.  Falungong spokespersons countered that these were simply avenues for facilitating practice.¹⁶

          Falungong protests have been tightly organized and coordinated. One official Chinese source noted that between April 25, 1999 and early August 1999, after Falungong had come under intense pressure from Chinese authorities, it caused “307 sieges of party and government organs.” On one day alone, July 21, 1999, “several thousand” demonstrated before the provincial government complex in Hubei, 700 protested in Anhui, an unspecified number in Hunan, and over 2,000 in front of the Guizhou Provincial Government office in Guiyang.¹⁷ 

          Falungong’s tactic of mounting orderly public protests had been in use for several years before it backfired on April 25, 1999, when at least 10,000 men and women quietly demonstrated for legitimacy outside Zhongnanhai, the compound in the heart of Beijing where the Chinese Communist Party leadership lives and works. The mass rally triggered an aggressive Chinese government response and, as described in more detail below, marks a major turning point in Falungong-government relations. Falungong leaders apparently thought there would be no repercussions from the April 25 demonstration even though it was much larger than earlier protests and at a much more sensitive site. According to a Falungong spokesman, until then “the government had been mostly supportive of us

The Membership

          Falungong spokespersons estimate that in 1999, at the start of the crackdown, membership peaked at 100 million practitioners in some thirty countries, over seventy million in China alone. Government figures have varied widely, but have also shown the movement to be significant. As noted above, the government estimated forty million Falungong followers at the end of 1998; in February 2001, it put the number at some two million, far smaller than the earlier estimate but still far larger than any other known non-governmental social organization or dissident movement in China.¹⁹

          Although most practitioners seem to come from urban districts, primarily small cities and towns where its “guidance stations” are located, Falungong is both a rural and urban phenomenon. The few easy-to-learn and easy-to-perform exercises—there are only five—are well adapted to an urban or village life style.²⁰ 

          One segment of the Falungong population, consisting of well-educated professionals, academics, scientists, and medical personnel, among others, gives the movement a certain cachet. Other practitioners are computer-literate technocrats and students accustomed to using the Internet and e-mail systems that facilitated Falungong’s growth. They have kept it alive in the face of intense official pressure. Some, including Falungong leaders Li Chang and Wang Zhiwen, were members of the Chinese Communist Party, well-placed in key government ministries including the security apparatus; others, such as retired Lieutenant General Li Qihua and Lieutenant Colonel Zhao Xinli, were officers in the People’s Liberation Army.²¹ The Party leadership found this latter group particularly threatening.

          Another group of Falungong followers includes men and women in their fifties and sixties, members of the 1966-76 Cultural Revolution’s “lost generation.” Many are workers or lower-level government functionaries who missed out on educational opportunities when the schools were closed, and who in the late 1990s lost their jobs or were “temporarily” laid off with the restructuring of state-owned enterprises or retrenchment within government bureaucracies.²² Instead of the expected cradle-to-grave security, including all-important health care, this group has had to struggle on small pensions or welfare payments. Instead of the personal support networks and the opportunities for socializing that came through work relationships, they experienced dislocation and isolation. Participation in Falungong’s activities, often based in public parks, may have addressed some of their health care, psychological, and economic needs.²³

          Practitioners could take part in Falungong on a number of different levels, from simply exercising, in public or at home, to directly confronting authorities and risking severe reprisals. Practitioners who wanted to be more involved could take on responsibility for recruitment, for production or distribution of Falungong literature, or for other organizational matters; others chose, often repeatedly, to join protests and, thus, to confront the government’s security apparatus. A practitioner’s choice of activities likely reflected what it was about Falungong that was most meaningful to him or her, the exercise, the meditation and spirituality, or the communal aspects. Chinese authorities implicitly recognized the differences by meting out different punishments for different forms of commitment.²⁴ 

Freedom of Belief in China

          The crackdown on Falungong is reminiscent of the long history of efforts by the Chinese Communist Party to eradicate religion, and when that proved impossible, to permit its citizens to “enjoy freedom of religious belief” and to protect “normal religious activities,” but only under state control.²⁵ 

          Much of initial religious policy was designed to bring so-called Western religions under Chinese control by replacing “imperialist forces” with “independent, self-governed, and autonomous churches.”²⁶ At first, foreign clerics were deported or executed along with their Chinese counterparts. As a second step the government mandated that there be no institutional ties with foreign religious bodies and began the process of crafting a bureaucracy from the local level on up that could effectively oversee all churches, mosques, monasteries, and temples. Although the work was violently interrupted during the Cultural Revolution (1966-76), when all religious expression was prohibited and driven underground, it began again in the early 1980s when Chinese leaders realized they needed cooperation from all sectors of society to advance their development agenda. Full achievement of the state’s official atheist ethic could be postponed indefinitely; for the time being it would apply only to Party members. But the government’s belief that religion is inherently subversive, a vehicle for foreign and domestic anti-China forces, continued to drive religious policy and contributed to the crackdown on Falungong.

          Although the Chinese constitution protects freedom of belief and “normal” religious activities, a series of regulations circumscribes both. Some date from the 1980s; the most recent, “Rules for Implementation of the Provisions on the Administration of Religious Activities of Aliens within the Territory of the People's Republic of China,” was promulgated on September 26, 2000. These regulations provide for financial oversight on the part of government authorities, vetting of religious leaders and religious publications, determination of religious curricula, and a program to bring religious beliefs into conformity with socialism. To illustrate that the state was to control all religious expression, Chinese officials dealt harshly with religious leaders who refused to be coopted. Catholic bishops, Tibetan monks, Protestant clerics, and Muslim imams who inspired extraordinary loyalty from worshipers or who resisted government edicts went to prison or simply were “disappeared.” Nor did the government hesitate to use mass campaign- style tactics in areas where local antagonism to official religious policies was well entrenched.²⁷ The same tactics—new laws and regulations, harsh sentences, and a mass campaign—were applied to Falungong.

          The government’s constitutional guarantee of freedom to believe and protection of “normal religious activities” falls far short of applicable international law standards. First, thre is no legal protection for belief systems other than religion.  By contrast, Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) distinguishes between religion and belief and recognizes that freedom of choice pertains to both. Chinese authorities limit the right to “have or to adopt a religion or belief of [one’s] choice” in still another way, by recognizing only five faiths as legitimate, Daoism, Buddhism, Islam, Catholicism, and Protestantism (called Christianity in China). Thus, Falungong would not qualify for constitutional protection even if it were a religion, which it emphatically says it is not.²⁸ It is the one thing on which Falungong practitioners and Chinese authorities agree.

          China’s religious policy fails to meet international standards in still another way:  its protection only of “normal” religious activities and its failure to define normal in ways consistent with Article 18 or with the standards for derogation therein. Under international law, the only limitations on manifestation of religion or belief in “worship, observance, practice, and teaching,” “individually or in community with others...in public or private,” must be “prescribed by law” and be “necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others.” Although Chinese officials have claimed that Falungong poses a threat to each area listed, they have failed to provide evidence in support of their accusations. Peaceful gatherings in public parks to exercise and perhaps meditate violate none of the proscriptions, nor do parents who school their children “in conformity with their own convictions,” as some Falungong practitioners do.

          The 1991 U.N. General Assembly “Declaration on the Elimination of All Form of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief” further elaborates on the rights permitted believers, a category to which Falungong practitioners belong. Article 6 is particularly applicable to their case, including as it does the right to “write, issue and disseminate relevant publications,” “to teach a religion or belief in places suitable for these purposes,” and “to establish and maintain communications with individuals and communities in matters of religion and belief at the national and international levels.” Chinese authorities have banned all further production and dissemination of Falungong materials and confiscated and burned hundreds of thousands of books, pictures, and tapes. The courts have sent distributors, even those who have handed out a few leaflets, to prison or labor camps. Communication among practitioners all across China has been branded a plot to overthrow the government, and has resulted in long prison sentences for alleged organizers.

^[1] From a human rights perspective it is irrelevant whether Falungong is termed a “cult,” a “sect,” a “heretic” organization, etc.  What is critical is that individuals not be punished for the substance of their beliefs.

^[2] “Fitness and Health Through Qigong,” Beijing Review, Volume 32, No.17, April 20-24, 1989, pp. 20-24.

^[3] James Tong, “Behind the Falungong Facade: Organizational Structure and Finance,” unpublished article, September 2000 (copy on file at Human Rights Watch).

^[4] “Notice Issued by the Press and Publication Administration of the People’s Republic of China: A Reiteration of Opinions Concerning the Disposal of Falun Gong Publications,” Chinese Law and Government, Volume 32, No.5 (issue titled “The Battle Between the Chinese Government and the Falun Gong,” Ming Xia and Shiping Hua, eds.), September-October 1999, pp. 29-30.  The notice originally was published in the People’s Daily, Overseas Edition, July 24, 1999, p. 3.

^[5] “Falungong, Part 2: A rude awakening,” Francesco Sisci, Asia Times Online, January 2001.

^[6] For details, see Ian Johnson, “A Blind Eye: China’s Rigid Policies on Religion Helped Falun Dafa for Years --- Then a Buddhist, an Atheist and Group’s Own Tactics Sparked the Crackdown --- A Bureau Called Office 610,” Wall Street Journal, December 13, 2000.

^[7] Oliver August, “Chinese target new spiritual group,” The Times of London, December 6, 1999; Charles Hutzler, “China moves against exercise group in Falun Gong‑like crackdown,” Associated Press Newswires, January 31, 2000; John Leicester, “China wages silent war on health, meditation groups,” Associated Press Newswires, April 24, 2000; “China Said To Confiscate Assets Of Banned Meditation Sect,” Dow Jones International News, September 8, 2000; Vivien Pik-Kwan Chan, “100 Zhong Gong offices shut down,” South China Morning Post, February 2, 2001.

^[8] “China demands repatriation from USA of Zhong Gong founder,” BBC Monitoring, September 23, 2000, from Xinhua, September 23, 2000; “China demands USA return Zhong Gong sect leader,” BBC Monitoring, April 20, 2001, from Xinhua, April 20, 2001; “China urges USA to repatriate banned sect leader,” BBC Monitoring, June 14, 2001, from Zhongguo Xinwen She, June 14, 2001.

^[9] “Report: China jails meditation master, planning to extend crackdown,” Associated Press Newswires, January 19, 2000; “Report: 600 leaders of banned Chinese exercise group arrested,” Associated Press Newswires, March 4, 2000; “Report: China sentences four leaders of banned Zhong Gong sect,” Associated Press Newswires, December 29, 2000; “China sentences Zhong Gong leader to seven years on tax charge,” BBC Monitoring, September 11, 2001; “China: Two Henan Zhong Gong members sentenced on subversion charges,” BBC Monitoring, September 20, 2001.

^[10] Zhuan Falun, Lecture One, http://www.falundafa.org/book/english/lecture1.html, p. 2.

^[11] David Ownby, “Falungong as a Cultural Revitalization Movement: An Historian Looks at Contemporary China,” Talk Given at Rice University, October 20, 2000, Transnational China Project Commentary (text based on audio transcript), http://www.ruf.rice.edu/~tnchina/commentary/ownby1000.html. See also the booklet “Compiled by Falungong practitioners in North America” (2nd edition, Dec 1999).

^[12] Zhuan Falun (English Version), Li Hongzhi, Third Translation Edition (Updated March 2000, USA), http://www.falundafa.org/eng/books.htm, p.81. See also pp. 7, 9, 15, 28, 37, 45, and 108.

^[13] Ibid., p.17.

^[14] Ibid., p.26.

^[15] Human Rights Watch interview with Falungong practitioners (names withheld), New York, July 1999.

^[16] “An Adverse Current in the Progress of Social Development -- Sixth Commentary on Exposing the Essence and Harm of ‘Falun Gong,’” Renmin Ribao, August 14, 1999, in “Renmin Ribao Slams Li Hongzhi ‘Fallacies,’” FBIS, August 17, 1999.  For an overview of Falungong’s organizational and financial arrangements, see James Tong, “Behind the Falungong Facade...,” unpublished article.

^[17] “The Political Aims of More than 300 Sieges -- First Commentary on Exposing and Criticizing the Essence and Harm of ‘Falun Gong,’” Renmin Ribao, August 5, 1999.

^[19] “According to Liu Jing, There Are Only About 2 Million ‘Falungong’ Followers in China,” Zhongguo Xinwen She, February 27, 2001, in “Anti-Cult Office Puts Falungong Followers in China at 2 Million,” FBIS, February 28, 2001. By comparison, Chinese Communist Party membership stands at about 65 million.“Number of CPC Members Surpassing 64.5 Million: Official,” People’s Daily Online, http://english.peopledaily.com.cm/200106/01/eng20010601_71575.html. At its height, maybe a million people participated in the 1989 pro-democracy movement in Beijing. The fledgling China Democracy Party optimistically claimed some 7,000 members before the Chinese government moved to annihilate it in November 1998.

^[20] Richard Madsen, “Understanding Falun Gong,” Current History, September 2000, pp. 243-47.

^[21] Michael Laris, “Chinese Sentence 4 Falun Leaders; Jail Terms Range Up to 18 Years,” Washington Post, December 27, 1999; Seth Faison, “Chinese General Forced to Spurn Falun Gong Ties,” New York Times, in Pittsburgh Post‑Gazette, July 31, 1999; “Report: China holds army officer for refusing to renounce sect,” Associated Press Newswires, June 28, 2000.

^[22] Madsen, “Understanding Falun Gong,” Current History.

^[23] Ibid.

^[24] “China: Circular urges punishment for core Falun Gong organizers,” BBC Worldwide Monitoring, August 25, 1999, text published in Xinhua, August 24, 1999.

^[25] See Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, Article 36.

^[26] See “Document 19: The Basic Viewpoint and Policy on the Religious Question During Our Country’s Socialist Period,” in Asia Watch (now Human Rights Watch), “Freedom of Religion in China,” January 1992, pp.36-48.

^[27] See “Enforcement Plan for Curbing the Illegal Activities of the Underground Church According to Law,” Human Rights Watch, China: State Control...,” pp. 80-89.

^[28] Freedom of religion and belief are both protected under international human rights law (International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), article 18, adopted Dec. 16, 1966, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), entered into force March 23, 1976, signed by China in October 1998, not yet ratified).

III. DEFIANCE AND RESPONSE: A CHRONOLOGY

          Chinese authorities initially treated Falungong as a loosely knit group of quirky but benign qigongdevotees. All this changed on April 25, 1999 when Falungong showed its capacity to quickly mobilize massive numbers. From all reports, more than 10,000 practitioners, most of them middle-aged, lined up in an orderly column around two sides of Zhongnanhai, the compound in the heart of Beijing where China’s leaders live and work. They had begun arriving in groups, primarily from townships in the countryside, as early as 3 a.m. Young leaders saw to it that strict discipline was observed. For example, practitioners were forbidden to speak with foreigners or with members of the press, to hoist banners, to shout slogans or distribute pamphlets, or to litter. By late afternoon the followers had dispersed, as quickly and as quietly as they had come. Onlookers said the police were as orderly as the demonstrators.

          For almost three months after the April 25 demonstration, the Chinese leadership was ominously quiet. That is not to say that the forthcoming crackdown was unexpected or that Falungong leaders were unprepared. On April 28, a government official, warning believers not to repeat the April 25 protest, said in a Xinhua interview that ran in newspapers and on the air, “Those who jeopardize social stability under the pretext of practicing any ‘qigong’ will be dealt with according to the law.”²⁹ By May 7, reports were circulating that President Jiang Zemin had called the group a major threat, that a high-level task force had been formed with Party leaders Hu Jintao and Luo Gan in charge, and that the decision to designate Falungong an illegal organization had already been made.³⁰ By June 1999, security in Beijing had been tightened. Early in the month, police held several busloads of practitioners in a local stadium for a day.³¹ Later in June, some 3,000 police officers cleared out practice sites on Changan Avenue, Beijing’s major thoroughfare, and vowed to clean up all public practice sites in the city.³² Even as Party officials denied reports of an imminent crackdown,

 they warned Falungong leaders to stop spreading rumors designed to “provoke” the membership into readying demonstrations.³³

          The Chinese leadership also began to prepare the general public and rank-and-file Party members for the upcoming campaign. On June 20, Renmin Ribao (People’s Daily), the Chinese Communist Party newspaper, launched a “theoretical” series that obliquely set out the rationale for the crackdown. Without mentioning Falungong, the initial article discussed the necessity of opposing superstition and pseudo-science and advocating a worldview encompassing science and technology, Marxism-Leninism, and materialism if the goal of rapid development and modernization were to be achieved.³⁴ Other commentaries explicitly addressed how dangerous Falungong had become. They stressed its political orientation and its threat to the Chinese Communist Party’s power, the risks it posed to the nation’s stability, and the appalling consequences—allegedly 1,400 deaths and counting—of Li Hongzhi’s resistance to scientific medical practice. The articles also made explicit how Party members, cadres, public security officials, and judicial officers were to conduct themselves. They were expected to maintain discipline and be consistent cultural exemplars—a veiled warning that they not practice Falungong—and they were to stay within the law when “combating” the Falungong threat no matter how resistant practitioners might be.³⁵

          Falungong responded immediately and publicly. Li Hongzhi set the line— “we do not involve ourselves in politics and we abide by the laws of the country”—and, foreshadowing events to come, Falungong spokespersons vigorously protested the government's use of the terms “cult” and “sect.”³⁶ They also insisted, somewhat disingenuously, that the April event was “spontaneous.”³⁷ It quickly became evident, that despite Li Hongzhi’s declaration that he would “not take Falungong practitioners to confront [the government]” even in the face of provocation, members were mobilizing resistance.³⁸ Ten days before the first roundup of key Falungong organizers on July 20, mass protests against media criticism erupted in several cities.³⁹ 

          Once preparations were complete, Chinese officials moved quickly and decisively on several fronts, rounding up leaders and practitioners; issuing a series of directives that would allow the government to later claim its crackdown had a legal basis; destroying Falungong material including books, tapes, photographs, and posters; and issuing a steady stream of invective against Li Hongzhi and Falungong.

          July 20, 1999: just after midnight public security officers throughout China quietly detained numerous Falungong leaders.⁴⁰ Three days of massive demonstrations in some thirty cities followed. In Beijing and other cities, police held protesters in sportsstadiums.⁴¹

          July 22: the Ministry of Civil Affairs and the Ministry of Public Security acted jointly to dissolve Falungong and its parent organization, the Falun Dafa Research Society; to ban the propagation of Falungong in any form including public practice; and to prohibit anyone from disrupting social order or confronting the government.⁴² 

          July 23: the Chinese Communist Party declared the “‘falungong’ incident [on April 25] the most serious political incident” since the 1989 pro-democracy protests in Tiananmen Square.⁴³ The Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party banned its members from practicing Falungong and launched an intra-Party study campaign to make certain cadres understood how great a threat Falungong represented and how incompatible its belief system was with Marxism.The Ministry of Personnel followed with a similar order, adding that “government functionaries must take a clear stand in opposing...Falun Dafa.”⁴⁴ The People’s Liberation Army instructed all personnel “to take the lead in eliminating the influences of Falun Gong.”⁴⁵ In early May, the Central Military Commission had already ordered its active and retired personnel and their families to distance themselves from Falungong.⁴⁶

          July 26: the State Press and Publication Administration, Ministry of Public Security, State Administration of Industry and Commerce, General Administration for Customs, and the General Office of the State Leading Group for Wiping out Pornography jointly issued a circular calling for confiscation and destruction of all publications related to Falungong, including “books, pictures, audio-video products, and electronic publications,” and for investigation and punishment of “all units and individuals that have published, printed, copied, and distributed” such materials.⁴⁷ The General Customs Administration issued orders to intercept incoming and outgoing Falungong materials.⁴⁸ Several days later, with steamrollers and pulp mills at the ready, the campaign to destroy Falungong publications began in earnest. In Shanghai alone, 1,300 government workers engaged in a search and destroy missionthat netted 45,000 books and pictures, part of a one-week nationwide total of two million.⁴⁹ Falungong members reported that their overseas Internet sites came under electronic attack, such as repeated requests from one or several users that blocked others from accessing the sites, known technically as a “denial of service” attack. In other cases, sites were hacked into or servers compromised. At the same time, the government set up its own official sites so users could easily access government documents and critical commentaries related to the Falungong “threat.”⁵⁰ 

          July 29: the Ministry of Public Security issued an order for the arrest of Li Hongzhi on grounds that he had“spread superstitious and malicious fallacies to deceive people, resulting in the deaths of many practitioners” and had “organized gatherings, demonstrations and other activities to disturb public order without applying for permits according to law...”⁵¹ Interpol declined involvement on grounds that it did not take political or religious cases.⁵² 

          July 29: the Beijing Municipal Bureau of Justice issued a notice requiring all law firms to seek approval for requests by Falungong practitioners for consultation and representation.The announcement stipulated that all firms must notify the Office for Law Management, a sub-division of the Bureau of Justice, of any Falungong-related contacts and seek its approval before signing a contract.⁵³ Any legal explanations given to those seeking services must be in accord with the intent of the central authorities’ policy directives toward Falungong. The notice violates the rights of persons under international law to obtain legal counsel of their choosing. It also is inconsistent with international standards which call on governments to ensure that lawyers are able to perform their professional functions without intimidating hindrance, harassment, or improper interference.⁵⁴

          August 4: the Ministry of Public Security announced it would offer a substantial reward for the arrest of Li Hongzhi, $50,000 renminbi (approximately U.S.$6,250). However, in that China and the U.S. have no extradition treaty and the U.S. had already refused to consider a request for Li’s return, the announcement was intended largely for domestic consumption.

          From July on, Falungong protests were countered by police sweeps which sent thousands, if not tens of thousands of practitioners, to police lockups and makeshift facilities for short-term “reeducation.” According to Politburo member Li Lanqing, from the time of the July 22 Ministry of Public Security order until the end of October when tightened “cult” regulations went into effect, there were 35,792 occasions when followers were stopped by police and either taken away or told to leave Beijing.⁵⁵ Many more may have been rounded up before they could reach the capital.⁵⁶ 

          Throughout August and into September 1999, the government engineered a thoroughgoing media and publishing campaign to provide “evidence” of Falungong crimes so as to justify upcoming “lawful” prosecutions, to orchestrate public opinion to support the crackdown, to promote science and eradicate “pernicious” superstitious beliefs among the populace, and to cleanse the Party and all security organs of Falungong practitioners.⁵⁷ By then members of these units had been banned from practicing Falungong, participating in Falungong-organized activities, providing sites for such activities, holding any position in the organization, or spreading its materials.⁵⁸

          The media campaign featured an outpouring of rhetoric from just about every institution and social stratum on the “evil nature” of Falungong and its alleged efforts to hoodwink the public. Xinhua reported that “hundreds of thousands” of retired People’s Liberation Army and People’s Armed Police personnel avowed complete agreement with the Chinese Communist Party line on the Falun Gong issue.”⁵⁹ So, too, did religious leaders (including a Tibetan Living Buddha) who claimed to be concerned with protecting religious freedom.⁶⁰ Academic experts in the fields of politics, philosophy, sociology, education, psychology, science, law, and medicine contributed “opinions.”⁶¹ 

          Other Xinhua articles exhorted workers to “stand in the very front line The Xinhua appeal reflected the fact that women make up probably close to half of Falungong practitioners. Within China, women generally are viewed as less interested in science and technology and more likely to perpetuate traditional superstitious beliefs; they are also perceived as “play[ing] an irreplaceable role in families,” with the potential for passing on to the next generation the meaning and practices of Falungong.

          The most important part of the media campaign may have been the “investigatory” reports into Falungong’s accounts of its activities and motives which purported to show duplicity and subversive intent on the part of Falungong leaders. These accounts provided a justification for a legal assault on the organization and its individual practitioners. One such report purported to prove that Li Hongzhi and his lieutenants (who later received lengthy prison terms) meticulously orchestrated the April 25 protest for political gain. In so doing, the report argued, they posed a critical and unlawful threat to social order.⁶³ Another account similarly analyzed what it claimed was the political intent and social order danger behind other Falungong demonstrations.⁶⁴ Still another gave “evidence” of a tightly knit hierarchical organization unregistered with the Ministry of Civil Affairs and, therefore, operating illegally.⁶⁵ 

                Other accounts went to great lengths to refute Li Hongzhi’s theories on “disease-relief and health,” calling them “ungrounded gross inferences with absurd conclusions, absolutely lacking in science, truth, reliability and believability, to the point of being sheer nonsense.”⁶⁶ From the beginning of the crackdown, government authorities highlighted the dangers to public health implicit in Falungong theories, and suggested that Li Hongzhi and his lieutenants bore personal responsibility for the deaths of practitioners who heeded their fallacious medical advice.⁶⁷ Such emphasis allowed the Chinese leadership to claim it was on solid legal ground in shutting down the organization and jailing its “backbone elements.”⁶⁸ The text of Li’s warrant began, “Li Hongzhi has caused the deaths of people by organizing and utilizing the Falun Dafa Research Society and the Falun Gong organization.”⁶⁹

 Research Directorate, Immigration and Refugee Board, Ottawa, Request to Information response, February 9, 2001. There are three kinds of law firms in China, state run firms, collectives, and partnerships. All are answerable to the Ministry of Justice, sometimes directly or sometimes through the All China Lawyers Association.⁷⁰ An official Chinese news agency commentary on the leaders’ trials cited “using cult organizations in causing deaths” as one of their many crimes.⁷¹

                In late August, the Communist Party and State Council together issued a circular stating that “the overwhelming majority of ‘Falun Gong’ practitioners were themselves victims” who must be patiently educated, converted, and extricated. Core members who “made a clean ideological break” would be spared significant punishment.⁷² It would be another month, however, before the government completed a legal framework designed specifically to justify prosecution of leading “cult” organizers and proselytizers.

                In the meantime, Falungong leaders organized a two-track approach, on the one hand calling for dialogue with the government so as to peacefully settle the issues between them; on the other, demonstrating the organization’s ability to persuade foreign governments and non-governmental organizations to criticize the Chinese government’s crackdown.⁷³ Falungong members’ experience with e-mail and the Internet allowed the organization to evade Chinese authorities’ repeated attempts to block such communication and to spread information about what was happening day by day into and out of China.⁷⁴

                Events culminated in October and November 1999, some three months after the arrests of Falungong leaders and the first massive roundups of rank-and-file members. In the course of a month, the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (the legislature) and the judiciary tooka series of four “legal” steps to make it possible to more easily prosecute those allegedly organizing and using cults to commit crimes. Although Chinese authorities maintained there was nothing extralegal about the crackdown, they applied the new regulations retroactively, violating well-established international criminal justice standards against ex post facto laws.⁷⁵

                First, on October 8 and 9, 1999, the Supreme People's Court and the Supreme People's Procuratorate issued “Explanations...Concerning Laws Applicable to Handling Cases of Organizing and Employing Heretical Cult Organizations to Commit Crimes.” The document clarified the application of existing criminal law to cases allegedly involving organizing and making use of cult organizations. The document defined “heretical cults” as “those illegal organizations that have been established under the guise of religion, qigong or other forms, deifying their leading members, enchanting and deceiving others by concocting and spreading superstitious fallacies, recruiting and controlling their members, and endangering the society.” The “explanations” were made public at the end of October.⁷⁶ 

                On October 27, a People’s Daily article concluded that there was sufficient evidence to prove that Falungong was a true cult and, therefore, subject to the “Explanations” issued earlier in the month. Accusations included members’ willingness to sacrifice for their leader, their strict obedience to his will, an established hierarchical structure, a system of mind control, and heretical and salvationist ideas.⁷⁷ “The article concluded, “The Chinese Communist Party, which takes the welfare of its people as its prime concern, will take firm action in its ban on cults.”

                On October 30, the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress made a “Decision...on Banning Heretical Cult Organizations and Preventing and Punishing Cult Activities.”⁷⁸ The government, having publicly demonstrated in the People’s Daily article three days earlier that Falungong was indeed a true heretical cult, could now ban it for that reason alone, and not merely because it had not registered, the reason the government announced on July 22 when it initially banned the organization.

                Finally, on November 5, the Supreme Court completed the process with a circular giving instructions to people’s courts for trying criminal cases related to cults.⁷⁹ A week later, the first one-day trials took place in Haikou (Hainan province) Intermediate People’s Court.⁸⁰

                Even before the “legal” infrastructure was finalized, the judicial authorities had prepared charges against four major Falungong leaders. Although the news was not released until the day after the October 30 Standing Committee “Decision,” the leaders had been formally charged on October 19 with crimes ranging from organizing a cult to “stealing, illegally possessing and leaking state secrets” and “running an illegal business.”⁸¹ By November 22, according to the director general of the State Council Information Office, at least 150 people had been detained or were being sought on similar charges; by November 28, forty-four people had been indicted. Charges included causing the deaths of members, disturbing social order, using a cult to sabotage the law, and providing unauthorized medical services.⁸²

                Falungong supporters did not stay silent. On October 25, practitioners mounted defiant protests in Tiananmen Square—thousands had surreptitiously infiltrated Beijing—and succeeded in capturing the world’s attention and highlighting police abuse.⁸³ But the protests did nothing to bring the two sides to the bargaining table or force retraction of the “evil cult” label. On December 26, 1999, as roundups continued and the protests diminished, at least for a time, the Chinese leadership sent its clearest message to date with the sentencing of four key Falungong organizers by the Beijing No.1. Intermediate People’s Court. Two of the four, members of the Chinese Communist Party, received sixteen- and eighteen-year prison terms for “organizing and using the cult organization to undermine the implementation of laws, causing human deaths by organizing and using the cult organization and illegally obtaining state secrets.”⁸⁴ Police responded to the immediate resumption of peaceful protests by questioning and detaining several dozen practitioners, in some cases forcibly dragging them out of Tiananmen Square.⁸⁵ 

                Throughout 2000, every action taken by Chinese authorities to stop Falungong activities and punish its leaders met carefully orchestrated defiance. China’s periodic claims to have won the war rang hollow in the face of Falungong’s success in rallying international condemnation of the crackdown.⁸⁶ It was able to do so in part through continuous protests in Tiananmen Square, in part through a sophisticated media strategy, and in part through vigorous lobbying of Western governments.

                According to official Chinese media, the quiet, persistent protests in Beijing by small groups or individual practitioners had grown to involve hundreds of protesters daily by December 2000.⁸⁷ On holidays such as October 1, 2000 (National Day), New Year’s Eve, Chinese New Year, or days that carried particular significance for Falungong, participants could number 1,000 or more.⁸⁸ Falungong members, many of them middle-aged women, courted detention by unfurling banners or meditating. Within minutes, police hustled them off to waiting vans; kicking, punching, dragging them by their clothes or their hair; and knocking them over if they did not move quickly or if they tried to get away. Falungong organizers saw to it that the international media was on hand to witness the juxtaposition of peaceful protest and violent response, and they drew attention to the details of formal arrests, detentions, and suspicious deaths in custody. Falungong spokespersons issued media alerts; information was posted on the many overseas Falungong websites; and journalists were alerted to planned demonstrations.

                China’s crackdown on Falungong demonstrations in Tiananmen Square and elsewhere has violated the right to freedom of assembly as protected under Article 21 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Freedom of assembly has been described as “a special institutionalized form of freedom of expression.”⁸⁹ Falungong practitioners when they assembled did no more than silently perform their slow-motion exercises, hold up banners, or scatter leaflets. Public security officers, in their hurry to clear demonstrations from public areas as quickly as possible, did not hesitate to use violence. This use of force to break up Falungong gatherings is clear interference by the state of the rights to peaceful assembly and expression.

                Under the ICCPR, the right of peaceful assembly may be restricted “in the interests of national security or public safety (ordre public), the protection of public health or morals or the protection of the rights and freedom of others.” China has asserted that its actions against Falungong met these criteria. However, such derogation of fundamental rights must be imposed in conformity with law, serve one of the listed purposes and be necessary for attaining the stated purpose.⁹⁰ A national security rationale requires a serious case of political or military threat to the entire nation, a charge made by the government, but never substantiated. For a public safety rationale to be credible, a specific threat to the personal safety or physical integrity of persons is necessary. Again, the government relied on generalities in invoking the exception, as it did in its attempts to legitimatize its crackdown for reasons of public order, public health and morals, and rights and freedoms of others.⁹¹ Falungong protests have not even blocked traffic, let alone caused a public disturbance.

                Overseas practitioners traveled to the mainland, many on Chinese passports, from Canada, the U.S., Australia, Japan, and other countries in part to demonstrate the worldwide appeal of Falungong, in part to help organize protests and devise strategies. Many were quickly caught, held briefly for questioning, and deported.⁹² Once home, they publicized their own experiences in custody as well as the pressures their Chinese counterparts faced. By the end of November 1999, People’s Daily had denounced Falungong for colluding with “foreign anti-China forces”; by mid-April 2000, the government accused Li Hongzhi and Falungong of having “publicly given themselves up to the anti-China forces and actively served as their anti-China tool.”⁹³ By May, Teng Chunyan, a U.S. permanent resident and Falungong member, was in detention. Her three-year sentence in December 2000 for “spying and illegally revealing information to overseas agents” effectively shut down overseas participation in Falungong activities within China proper.⁹⁴

                Other Falungong activities were curtailed as the risks associated with them escalated. In December 1999, the central government had instituted a policy which made local officials, from governors on down, personally responsible if residents from their areas reached Beijing to protest.⁹⁵ As the incidence of demonstrations increased and as the central government’s frustration grew, so did the pressure on local officials to stem the flow of protestors.

                In at least one city, Weifang, Shandong province, the results were disastrous. The city’s proximity to Beijing, only some 300 miles distant, the existence of a direct railroad link and relatively good roads, and the large concentration of Falungong followers in the area made it reasonably easy for practitioners to travel to Tiananmen Square time and again. As the protests escalated, so did the threat to local officials’ careers, even the governor’s.⁹⁶ He responded by setting up a system of fines for officials who allowed practitioners to reach Beijing. The provincial government fined mayors and county heads who in turn fined Political and Legal Commission members;⁹⁷ they then fined village chiefs who fined the police officers in what had come to be called “transformation centers,” special detention facilities that used brainwashing and physical abuse to “help” practitioners renounce Falungong beliefs. As a result of the new system, police beatings in the Weifang area increased in severity, partly as a warning to practitioners to stay out of Beijing, and partly to extort money to cover the officers’ fines.⁹⁸ Suspicious deaths in custody in Shandong province significantly outstripped those in other parts of China.⁹⁹

                By October 2000, a year after the “evil cult” regulations went into effect, the government was demonstrating less and less tolerance for rank-and-file practitioners who continued to defy the government by participating in protest rallies. Instead of sending them back to their hometowns for “transformation,” they were immediately detained. If they were identified as repeat offenders, they were quickly sentenced administratively and shipped to reeducation through labor camps, some to serve sentences as long as three years.¹⁰⁰ In addition, officials apparently cared so little about international condemnation that they hardly bothered to hide the daily brutality in Tiananmen Square.

                The leadership’s frustration with the failure of its efforts to quickly and thoroughly dismantle Falungong was also evident in its media campaign. A long Xinhua commentary in October 2000 restated allegations of the cult’s danger, detailing how totally corrupt it was, how little support it had among the masses, and how it “openly opposes the party and government and has transformed completely from head to tail into a reactionary political organization with the aim of overthrowing the People’s Republic of China and the socialist system.”¹⁰¹ By January 2001, the government had to admit that, contrary to earlier statements, the war had not yet been won, and the “broad masses” had to be made to understand the “duration, complexity and ferocity of our battle with Falun Gong.”¹⁰² In an effort to showcase Falungong’s tenacity and deviousness, China Central Television, for the first time, aired footage of protests and of followers claiming divinity.

                By the Lunar New Year 2001, the government’s campaign began to make significant headway. On January 23, New Year’s Eve, and for China the eve of the new millennium, a group of men and women attempted to set themselves on fire in Tiananmen Square. One woman died on the spot; her twelve-year-old daughter succumbed weeks later; three people were hospitalized; and two failed to ignite the gasoline they carried.¹⁰³ On March 1, Chinese authorities announced the arrest of two persons who, they said, had helped orchestrate the self-immolations.¹⁰⁴

                Li Hongzhi and Falungong spokespersons immediately denied that practitioners were involved, pointing out first that Falungong doctrine forbade suicide, and later that inconsistencies in the Chinese reports of the incident suggested Chinese authorities had staged the immolations.¹⁰⁵ Others viewed the Falungong disclaimer with a good deal of skepticism, and questions about the incident, such as whether practitioners were involved and the role of security officers, remain unresolved.¹⁰⁶

                China responded to the event unusually quickly, completely shutting down Tiananmen Square and whipping up public revulsion. Within a month, authorities issued a print run of glossy pamphlets entitled “The Whole Story of the Self-Immolation Incident Created by Falun Gong Addicts in Tiananmen Square,” which featured color photographs of the charredbodies. Officials also attempted to claim the moral high ground by presenting their response to Falungong as protection of human rights, energetic participation in a worldwide effort to limit the ravages caused by cults, and patient, professional efforts to deprogram misguided Falungong victims.¹⁰⁷ According to the secretary general of the State Council’s Office for the Prevention and Handling of Evil Cults (established in November 2000), “China’s effort to expose and criticize ‘Falungong’[is] part of the world’s anti-cult struggle. We are ready to form the broadest united front with the global anti-cult struggle.”¹⁰⁸ He went on to compare Falungong to the Branch Davidians in the U.S., the Aum Shinrikyo in Japan, and the Movement for the Restoration of the Ten Commandments of God in Uganda.

                Chinese authorities used the tragedy of the twelve-year-old immolation victim as an opportunity to stress their concern for children and to educate youngsters to the alleged evils of Falungong.¹⁰⁹ “Veteran comrades,” members of provincial committees of the government-established Work of Caring for Future Generations, held forums to expose the “true nature” of Falungong to students and teachers.¹¹⁰ In response to a call from the official Communist Youth League, some eight million students joined the newly formed Anti-Cult Action by the Youth Civilized Communities Across the Nation and began propaganda and educational activities in one hundred cities using window displays, posters, leaflets, video displays, and lectures to advocate science and denounce Falungong. Anti-Falungong classes were scheduled in schools; and 12 million youngsters nationwide reportedly denounced Falungong in writing.¹¹¹ 

                Officials saved their harshest rhetoric for Li Hongzhi, comparing him to Hitler, and labeling the self-immolations a direct result of his “incitement and spiritual control.”¹¹² As evidence, they cited brief passages of Li’s writings out of context that appeared to support their claims.¹¹³ The incident also provided an opportunity for the Chinese leadership to disparage “heresies” which, it claimed, Li had deliberately spread through “cheating, hinting, rumor-mongering, intimidating” in order to deceive practitioners.¹¹⁴

                In a more virulent replay of the August 1999 effort, all sectors of society were mobilized. People’s Daily, the Party newspaper, and Xinhua, the official news service, ran lengthy “exposés.”¹¹⁵ In Shanghai, a petition to combat “evil cults,” first circulated on February 13, was expected to yield 100,000 signatures within a ten-day period.¹¹⁶ Religious leaders expressed their anger, and jurists insisted on further legal action.¹¹⁷ High on the list of the leadership’s priorities was publication of recantations by former Falungong members.¹¹⁸

                The most significant changes came after a Central Work Conference (a meeting of high Party officials from all over China called by the Party Central Committee) in mid-February 2001, when President Jiang told provincial and municipal Party officials to strengthen local control over Falungong practitioners.¹¹⁹ The plan called for the immediate formation of local “anti-cult task forces” and similar units in universities, state enterprises, and social organizations to augment the “610 office” (named for the date of its founding), which reportedly had been directing the crackdown since June 10, 1999, and the “propaganda work office, which was in charge of the media campaign.”¹²⁰ It ordered local officials to detain active practitioners and to make certain that families and employers guaranteed the isolation of those unwilling to formally recant. There were reports that the central government had ordered local officials to use systematic violence and stepped up psychological coercion, the latter conducted by former adherents, against hard-core practitioners.¹²¹ Estimates at the time suggested that 10,000 practitioners were in custody, 5,000 were refusing to renounce their beliefs, and 1,000 known activists were at large.¹²² In addition, officials worried that many of those who had been held only briefly—estimated in the tens of thousands—would return to practice if controls were even minimally relaxed.¹²³ 

                In sum, China’s leaders seemingly were leaving nothing to chance. At the same time as they were again claiming “a great victory” and rewarding some 1,600 citizens who had contributed to it, they warned that the goal of completely eliminating Falungong entailed a “complicated, sharp and long-term” struggle.¹²⁴

                The deaths in Tiananmen Square also forced a change in Falungong tactics. The daily small-scale demonstrations in Beijing ceased all together. The leadership may have concluded that the protests had outlived their usefulness for demonstrating Chinese abuses or for informing an overseas audience of Falungong’s harmlessness. The organization’s tacticians may also have been fearful of additional self-immolations and the damage that another such incident might do to Falungong’s international reputation. In addition, stepped-up surveillance by China’s security forces may have prevented practitioners from reaching Beijing, or the danger to protestors may have become too great to tolerate.¹²⁵

                Falungong’s new strategy was directed towards getting the word out, both within China and overseas, about the treatment of Falungong practitioners in custody. The organization raised its concerns at the March-April 2001 meeting of the United Nations Human Rights Commission (CHR) in Geneva, on the anniversaries of the April 1999 protest and the July 1999 ban, and during the unexpected presence in New York of an official from Hubei province allegedly closely associated with the crackdown.¹²⁶ Falungong spokespersons arranged press conferences and rallies in major world cities, organized marches and motorized processions, orchestrated hunger strikes around the world, and issued numerous press releases. Falungong websites, accessible from some forty-five countries, continued to document China’s human rights abuses.

                Within China, Falungong used mass mailings and handouts instead of demonstrations to “spread the truth” and to counter the ubiquitous official version of Falungong as an “evil cult.”¹²⁷ In a press release dated August 9, 2001 and issued in New York, Falungong acknowledged the tactic and indicated that “Practitioners sometimes also manage to post large posters and banners in major thoroughfares. They even set up loudspeakers on rooftops or trees around labor camps and in densely populated areas to broadcast news about the human rights abuses...”¹²⁸ 

                Through a series of web-based pronouncements, Li Hongzhi sought to hold together core practitioners inside China.¹²⁹ With Falungong’s tight organizational structure compromised by the on-going crackdown, computer savvy Falungong followers risked arrest in order to circumvent government computer firewalls and relay Li’s words to other practitioners.¹³⁰ It was not until December 24, 2001 that word of the arrests of six such practitioners between January and April 2001 came to light. On December 13, Beijing First Intermediate Court reportedly sentenced the six, all associated with Qinghua University, China’s most prestigious science and technology institution, to terms ranging between three and twelve years for distribution of Falungong material downloaded from the Internet.¹³¹

                In preparation for the CHR meeting, Falungong issued three lengthy reports, on abuses against women, on psychiatric abuse, and on conditions in labor camps.¹³² In a January 19, 2001 letter, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women communicated to Chinese authorities her “grave concerns” about the persecution of women in labor camps and transformation centers and inquired about forty specific cases.¹³³ As of late December 2001, the government had not responded, though it is not unusual for a government to take more than a year to do so. Nor are there any reports that Beijing has responded to a request for information submitted by the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Torture submitted on August 10, 2000.

                In Geneva, Chinese delegates were unsuccessful in their attempts to counter Falungong’s presence at the CHR by, for example, removing the organization’s literature from outside the meeting room.¹³⁴ A Chinese demand for cancellation of a Falungong press event scheduled to be held at a U.N. building was rebuffed by the sponsoring organization, the Geneva Association of U.N. correspondents.¹³⁵ 

                Falungong held demonstrations around the world commemorating the second anniversary of the mass protest at Zhongnanhai on April 25, 1999. In Tokyo, some sixty practitioners marched; in Hong Kong, some 200.¹³⁶ Other followers gathered in cities in Europe, the U.S., and Australia. In Beijing, some thirty scattered practitioners braved extraordinarily tight security to demonstrate, but police officers broke up the protests within minutes, dragging participants to waiting vans. Police officers also forced tourists photographing the incidents to expose their film.¹³⁷ 

                Falungong practitioners’ preparations for the second anniversary of the July 22, 1999 ban on their activities were more extensive. Organized around the theme “SOS! Urgent: Rescue the Falun Gong Practitioners Persecuted in China,” the campaign highlighted alleged torture, beatings, and deaths inside and outside prisons and labor camps. Most of the activity took place in the U.S. with followers from New York, Boston, Philadelphia, and Orlando marching to Washington D.C. to join followers from California in a July 19 rally. Groups in Taiwan and Hong Kong and marchers in Australia, Sweden, and Germany, relayed the same demand.¹³⁸

                An official Chinese government report intimated that overseas Falungong practitioners bore some responsibility for the deaths highlighted in the “SOS! Urgent” campaign through messages they allegedly had sent to their Chinese counterparts implying that “going to heaven after death is the highest level of practising.”¹³⁹ Falungong representatives countered, as they had after the Lunar New Year’s Eve deaths in Tiananmen Square, that “Falun Gong teaching does not permit killing, even ourselves.”¹⁴⁰ However, on June 23, Li Hongzhi had written that “the old, evil forces...have taken advantage of the unremoved notions that are at Dafa disciples’ human surface...to make their righteous thoughts falter. That is why some students aren’t able to endure amidst the agony of the persecution, and have done what a Dafa disciple can and should not do.” He went on, “Those who are ‘reformed’ and those who are being saved can only be beings deceived by the evil.”¹⁴¹ This message to practitioners, although ambiguous, has been interpreted by some academics studying Falungong as a call not to recant, and as a declaration that the sufferings practitioners are made to endure will bring them nearer to “consummation,” that is enlightenment and an indestructible body

                Chinese officials signaled through public statements and legal initiatives and through less-well publicized security strategies that they had no intention of relaxing the pressure. Public activities included an anti-cult exhibit in Beijing, a media blitz on the evils of Falungong featuring former adherents, and announcements about the trials of those allegedly responsible for orchestrating the self-immolation deaths in Tiananmen Square in January 2001.¹⁴² More importantly, behind the scenes, China’s leaders continued to enforce the “responsibility system,” whereby “all levels of government leaders, police, neighborhood cadres, work units and family members must receive punishment” if a practitioner reaches Beijing to protest.¹⁴³ The tactic made it possible to keep Falungong from making international headlines and allowed local authorities to continue to persecute believers with little chance of eyewitness international coverage. Overseas, Chinese embassy officials took on the task of weakening international support for Falungong.¹⁴⁴

                In March 2001, in speeches before the National People’s Congress, Premier Zhu Rongji and the second highest ranking figure in the CCP, former premier Li Peng, had made clear that elimination of Falungong was one of the year’s top priorities.¹⁴⁵ On June 11, promulgation of a new interpretation of the Criminal Law by the Supreme People’s Court and the Supreme People’s Procuratorate further escalated the crackdown. Interpretation II, as it was known, applied specifically to “cult organizations” and, according to Chinese authorities, was a response to Falungong’s “new schemes” and “new means.”¹⁴⁶ It clarified the punishments for a range of crimes, including incitement to injure oneself, self-immolation, leaking state secrets, subversion, separatist activities, small-scale “assemblies” by members of a banned sect, and small-scale publishing and distribution.¹⁴⁷ 

                At roughly the same time, “Opposing Religious Cults, Upholding Civilization,” an anti-cult exhibition in Beijing’s Chinese Revolutionary Military Museum, served as the centerpiece of the government’s public activities, attracting more than 200,000 visitors according to official reports.¹⁴⁸ Li Lanqing, vice-premier and member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo, was one of many high officials who made an appearance to warn that Falungong “will definitely use other tricks to make a last-ditch struggle, to create chaos and to destroy.”¹⁴⁹ State television followed his progress through the exhibition as he examined photographs of charred bodies and other macabre displays intended to showcase Falungong’s evil ways and emphasize the harm belief could precipitate. Television coverage also made a point of informing viewers of China’s involvement in what it alleged was a worldwide effort to eradicate dangerous cults. Official newspapers featured a group of more than one hundred former practitioners at the exhibit who had nothing but praise for the government’s success in “rescuing” them.¹⁵⁰ Sponsoring organizations included the Party’s Central Propaganda Department and its Central Commission for Guiding the Work of Spiritual Civilization Building, the State Council Office for Guarding Against and Handling Cult-Related Issues, the Public Security Ministry, the Ministry of Justice, and the Chinese Association of Science and Technology.¹⁵¹

                On July 19, five followers, including immolation survivor Wang Jindong, went on trial “for using an evil cult to organize a homicide.” Interpretation II had made clear that those found guilty of “organizing suicide plots” would be charged with murder and subject to the death penalty.¹⁵² The following day, People’s Daily denounced Falungong’s “anti-humanity” stance with a story, complete with a picture of the corpse, about a dedicated practitioner who allegedly neglected her health to support Li Hongzhi and whose death did not affect other practitioners’ support for Falungong. To draw attention to China’s policy of ever greater efforts to help followers understand Falungong’s fallacies, the article highlighted the revulsion allegedly felt not only by the general public but by those former practitioners who had been “successfully” reeducated.¹⁵³ On August 17, Beijing’s No.1 Intermediate People’s Court found the five defendants in the immolation case guilty of murder. Four of the five received sentences ranging from seven years to life in prison. The fifth, who reportedly confessed to her crime and implicated the others, was exempted from punishment. On August 19, the Beijing Daily (Beijing Ribao) reported that forty-five followers had been tried in nine separate cases over the “past few days.” At least five were sentenced to terms of up to thirteen years for a variety of offenses including renting a safehouse, organizing the printing of leaflets and banners, and recruiting followers for protests.¹⁵⁴

                As of December 2001, there was reason to believe that Falungong was having a hard time keeping its movement alive. China, using an array of legal and extra-legal tools had completely shut down public practice and demonstrations by Falungong adherents. Practice at work units was further curtailed. Some units had always summarily fired known practitioners, with job loss often meaning lost housing, lost schooling, lost pensions, and a report to the police. Other work units, especially those far removed from Beijing, had for a time overlooked solitary exercise and meditation until controls were tightened nationwide after the January 2001 deaths.¹⁵⁵ Although followers presumably could continue with solitary practice at home, even private practice proved dangerous when it was brought to the attention of the police or to Party officials.

^[29] “Chinese gov’t warns cult not to repeat protest,” Asian Political News, May 3, 1999.

^[30] Charles Hutzler, “China Sees Threat in Secret Sect,” AP Online, May 7, 1999; “Beijing Has Designated Falun Gong An Illegal Sect: Report,” Central News Agency (Taiwan), May 2, 1999, citing Hong Kong’s Ming Pao, May 2, 1999.

^[31] “Beijing police round up busloads of Falungong members: residents,” Agence France Presse, June 6, 1999; “Officials say Falungong members ‘gone home’ from stadium,” Agence France-Presse, June 7, 1999.

^[32] “Beijing Cleans up Falungong Exercise Grounds,” Hong Kong Tung Fang Jih Pao, June 28, 1999, in “Beijing Acts to Restrict Falungong Activities,” FBIS, July 16, 1999.

^[33] “China: Party statement dispels rumours on suppression of Falungong practitioners,” BBC Worldwide Monitoring, June 14, 1999.

^[34] “Renmin Ribao Commentary Urges End to Superstition,” Xinhua, June 20, 1999, in FBIS, June 21, 1999.

^[35] See, e.g., “Consolidate Marxist Beliefs--Fourth Commentator on Taking a Clear-Cut Stand in the Struggle to Expose and Criticize ‘Falungong,’” July 29, 1999, in “4th Commentator on Criticism of Falungong,” FBIS, August 3, 1999; “Clearly Distinguish Ideological and Political Right and Wrong,” Renmin Ribao, August 5, 1999, in “Renmin Ribao on Dealing With Falungong,” FBIS, August 6, 1999; “Recognizing the Political Essence and Serious Danger of ‘Falun Dafa,’” Xinhua Domestic Service, July 26, 1999, in “On ‘Falungong’ Political Essence, Danger,” FBIS, August 3, 1999; “Maintain Stability and Push Forward Reform and Development-- Ninth Commentator on Tightening Efforts in Handling and Solving ‘Falungong Problem,’” Renmin Ribao, August 16, 1999, in “9th Commentator on Handling Falungong,” FBIS, August 17, 1999; “Ban Illegal Organizations to Safeguard Social Stability,” Xinhua, July 30, 1999, in “Commentator Calls for Banning Falungong,” FBIS, August 2, 1999.

^[36] Jack Taylor, “Falungong leader speaks out about protest that rocked Beijing,” Agence France-Presse, May 2, 1999; “Falun Dafa followers reject cult status,” Agence France-Presse, May 3, 1999.

^[37] “Leader of Chinese sect that held silent protest shuns politics,” Associated Press Newswires, May 2, 1999.

^[38] “Falungong leader will not be drawn into confrontation with China,” Associated Press, June 17, 1999.

^[39] “Report: Chinese Buddhist Protest Held,” AP Online, July 10, 1999; “Halt Broadcast, Spiritual Group Warns China,” Asian Wall Street Journal, July 14, 1999; “Report: Thousands of followers protest attacks on sects,” Associated Press Newswires, July 18, 1999.

^[40] “AFP: Further on Authorities Crack Down on Falungong,” FBIS, July 21, 1999, from Agence France-Presse, July 20, 1999.

^[41] “China Bans Sect,” BBC Online Network, July 22, 1999.

^[42] “Decision of the Ministry of Civil Affairs of the People’s Republic of China Concerning the Banning of the Research Society of Falun Dafa” and “Notice of the Ministry of Public Security of the People’s Republic of China,” Chinese Law and Government, Volume 32, No.5 (issue titled “The Battle Between the Chinese Government and the Falun Gong,” Ming Xia and Shiping Hua, eds.), September-October 1999, pp. 31-32; documents originally published in People’s Daily, Overseas Edition, July 23, 1999, p.1.

^[43] “Wang Zhaoguo on Fight Against ‘Falungong,’” World News Connection, July 23, 1999, from World Reporter (TM).

^[44] “Circular of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist (CCP) Party on Forbidding Communist Party Members from Practicing Falun Dafa,” Chinese Law and Government, Volume 32, No.5 (issue titled “The Battle Between the Chinese Government and the Falun Gong,” Ming Xia and Shiping Hua, eds.), September-October 1999, pp.14-18, document originally published in People’s Daily, Overseas Edition, July 23, 1999, p.1; “Ministry of Personnel Issues Notice Stipulating that State Functionaries May Not Practice Falun Dafa,” ibid., pp.26-28, document originally published in People’s Daily, Overseas Edition, July 24, 1999, p.3.

^[45] “Be Models in Following Regulations and Observing Law -- Third Commentary on Taking a Clear-Cut Stand in Launching the Struggle to Expose and Criticize ‘Falungong,’” Beijing Jiefangjun Bao, July 27, 1999, in “3rd Commentator on Criticism of Falungong,” FBIS, August 2, 1999; “Chinese army supports ban on Falun Gong,” BBC Worldwide Monitoring, July 25, 1999, from Xinhua, July 23, 1999.

^[46] Vivien Pik-kwan Chan, “PLA vows to purge own ranks of sect: Probe finds surprising number of members,” South China Morning Post, July 24, 1999.

^[47] “Circular Issued on Eliminating Falungong Publications,” Xinhua, July 26, 1999, in FBIS, July 30, 1999.

^[48] “Public Security Ministry Revokes Li Hongzhi’s Passport,” Hong Kong Ming Pao, July 31, 1999, in FBIS, August 2, 1999.

^[49] “Localities Destroy Confiscated Falungong Publications,” Xinhua, July 29, 1999, in FBIS, July 29, 1999.

^[50] Peter Svensson, “Chinese officials try to hack U.S. Web sites, meditation group members say,” Associated Press Newswires, July 30, 1999; “Press administration circular bans Falun Gong publications,” BBC Worldwide Monitoring, July 27, 1999, from Xinhua.

^[51] “More on Security Ministry Spokesman on Li Being Wanted,” Xinhua, July 29, 1999, in FBIS, July 30, 1999.

^[52] “Interpol won’t aid search for Falun Gong leaders; Police organization rejects request from Chinese on political, religious grounds,” Baltimore Sun, August 4, 1999.

^[53] There are three kinds of law firms in China, state run firms, collectives, and partnerships. All are answerable to the Ministry of Justice, sometimes directly or sometimes through the All China Lawyers Association.

^[54] See Article 16, “Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers,” adopted by the Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Havana, Cuba, 27 August to 7 September 1990.

^[55] Renee Schoof, “China denies detaining more than 35,000 Falun Gong activists,” Associated Press Newswires, December 2, 1999.

^[56] “China’s Most Populous Province Fights Banned Sect,” Reuters, July 30, 1999.

^[57] Jasper Becker, “Falun Gong propaganda blitz ends,” South China Morning Post, August 25, 1999.

^[58] “Party Members Admit Being Fooled by Falungong Heresies,” FBIS, August 27, 1999, from Xinhua, August 21, 1999; Beijing Jiefangjun Bao, “Be Models in Following Regulations...,” FBIS, August 2, 1999.

^[59] The People’s Armed Police (PAP) is a paramilitary force, under military rather than police control, which deals with border control, domestic security, and social stability. Its duties sometimes overlap with those of public security bureaus (the police), and its members are often employed as prison guards.

^[60] “China: Retired servicemen criticize Falun Gong cult,” BBC Worldwide Monitoring, August 22, 1999, from Xinhua, August 5, 1999; “Tibetan Living Buddha Criticizes Falun Gong,” People’s Daily, August 3, 1999; “Report: Falungong Ban Does Not Hurt Religious Freedom in China,” Agence France-Presse, August 4, 1999; “Completely and Correctly Implement the Party’s Religious Policy and Criticize the ‘Falungong’ in a Clear-cut Manner,” Xinhua, August 4, 1999, in “CPC Committees Hold Lecture C